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IN 
The Supreme Court 
OF THE 
State of Utah 
OSCAR W. MOYLE and 
MAY P. MOYLE, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal 
corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 6328 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The present action of Oscar W. Moyle and May P. 
Moyle aga~st Salt Lake City grows out of a special pro-
ceeding instituted by Salt Lake City as plaintiff and 
Oscar W. Moyle and May P. Moyle as defendants filed 
in the District Court of the Third Judicial District for 
Salt Lake County, Utah, early in July, 1926. To that 
complaint the Moyles interposed a general and special 
demurrers. Those special proceedings may possibly be 
referred to as condemnation proceedings or intended as 
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such, but they were peculiar in nature and certainly 
were sui generis. The City claimed that by reason of a 
jam they were in under a contract with 'the Big Cotton-
wood Tanner Ditch Company it was necessary that the 
City acquire the water rights owned by the Moyles and 
which waters the Moyles diverted through the Tanner 
Ditch. This water was not water of the Big Cottonwood 
Tanner Ditch Company but water owned by the Moyles 
otherwise than as stockholders in said Company and the 
Moyles used the Tanner Ditch as a tenant in common 
with the Company in the ownership of the Tanner Ditch 
or at least as such tenant in common for that portion of 
the Ditch located on and above the :Moyle property. 
On those proceedings and on July 23, 1926, on mo-
tion of Salt Lake City, the Court ordered that Salt Lake 
City "is hereby authorized to take all the water of Big 
Cottonwood Creek now flowing in Big Cottonwood Tan-
ner Ditch and to turn into said Big Cottonwood Tanner 
Ditch other water suitable for irrigation in lieu and place 
of Big Cottonwood Creek water so taken therefrom by 
plaintiff, and it is further ordered that as soon as pos-
sible plaintiff shall in water pipes furnish or make avail-
able for defendants for domestic and culinary purposes 
sufficient water from Big Cottonwood Creek.'' The City 
in its complaint had alleged that the other waters to be 
turned into the Tanner Ditch were Utah Lake waters, 
not potable but fit for irrigation while the Big Cotton-
wood waters were potable. 
The case rested in the District Court until the de-
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murrer of the ~Ioylt•s was noticed Oct. 2, 1937, for hear-
ing, duly argued, and the general demurrer of the :Moyles 
was sustained and on Jan. 7, 1938, and on motion of the 
plaintiff therein, (Salt Lake City) and without notice 
to the ~Ioyles, the Court ordered the case dismissed. 
\Yhether the Court in that case erred in sustaining the 
demurrer or in granting the order of possession of the 
water we submit is wholly immaterial to the present 
action. The Court had jurisdiction of the subject matter, 
of the parties, and of the special proceedings, and there 
was no appeal by the City. 
The present action was brought by the Moyles 
against the City to recover the reasonable value of the 
use and possession of the water so taken under the order 
of July 23, 1926, from the time of such taking and also 
for the return of the waters to the plaintiffs (Moyles) 
herein and alleged their damages for the taking and with-
holding of the ,,~a ter in the sum of $4150.00 ( Abs. p. 3). 
The Defendant herein, Salt Lake City about one-half 
dozen times has repeated in its brief that counsel fo1· 
the l\foyles in open court disclaimed any damages to 
the plaintiffs. This, of course, is not correct. No counsel 
for plaintiffs ever at any time disclaimed any damages 
to the plaintiffs. What was said by counsel was that 
we were not claiming special damages but only general 
damages as set out in the complaint. See appellants 
brief pp. 15-24-27 and Abs. 148 and other places through-
out the brief of appellants. 
The l\[ oyles in addition to the water involved in this 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
litigation owned stock in the Big Cottonwood Tanner 
Ditch Company during all the time since July 1926, and 
for some time before. It will be necessary for the Court 
to keep this in mind all the time while reading the testi-
mony in this case. They owned something over 23 shares 
in the Corporation and were entitled as such stockholders 
to use the water represented by such shares. That water 
and the use thereof is not involved in this case but it is 
frequently referred to in the evidence. The water in-
volved in this case is described as 22% shares of water 
right in the Tanner Ditch (not in the Corporation) and 
the water right was appurtenant to land owned by the 
Moyles in the SE14 of Sec. 15, T 2 S, R 1 E, S. L. :M. 
in Salt Lake County. The water diverted by the Tanner 
Ditch is described as 1860 shares of which the Moyles 
own 2234 shares for use during the entire year; other 
independant owners own about 227 shares and the Big 
Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Company owns substantially 
1625 shares of the water so diverted. (Abs. 104 to 112). 
The figures do not quite reconcile but that is immaterial 
here. The fact to lmep in mind is that Moyle owned two 
water rights, one by virtue of his ownership of stock 
in the Corporation and the other (the one involved here) 
by ownership of a water right appurtenant to his land. 
Another fact to keep in mind to determine the weight 
to he given the witnesses on the question of value of the 
use of the water taken by the City is the place on the 
Tanner Ditch that the witnesses reside. The Moyles 
reside and took their water from the upper end of the 
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Tanner Ditch and only a short distance below its intake 
at the Big Cottonwood Creek. The \Yater there was a 
large stream running only a short distance in the Tanner 
Ditch and Yery desirable for household purposes. Real-
izing this, the :J[oyles refused to participate in the organ-
ization of the Corporation and refused to transfer their 
water rights in the Tanner Ditch to the Corporation. 
The people one to three miles further west more gen-
erally participated in the organization of the Corporation 
and transferred their water right or at least the control 
of it to the Corporation. When the City and the Corpo-
ration were negotiating the exchange agreement by which 
Utah Lake water from the City Canal was to be pumped 
into Cottonwood Creek bed and to be delivered to the 
Tanner Ditch at its intake, the 1\Ioyles, as stockholders 
of the Corporation, and some others on the upper part 
of the Tanner Ditch opposed the entering into of the ex-
change agreement by the Corporation. But the water 
users far down the Tanner Ditch had to conduct the 
water a long distance in the Tanner Ditch and very often 
a long distance in ordinary private irrigation ditches 
carrying only a small stream of water and such water 
was not desirable for household purposes. Those people 
were farming people and wanted irrigation water and 
for this purpose Utah Lake water was practically as good 
as Big Cottonwood Creek water and piped water for 
culinary purposes was most persuasive to them and they 
therefore desired the Corporation to enter into the ex-
change agreement. These facts enter in a large way into 
the attitude and opinion of the witnesses for Salt Lake 
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City on the question of the value of the use of the water 
taken by Salt Lake City and their opinions are all on 
the theory that Utah Lake water is just as valuable as 
Big Cottonwood stream water; in most instances, how-
ever, those witnesses expressed no opinion whatever on 
the value of Big Cottonwood stream water but only upon 
the value of any kind of water for irrigation. 
Prior to the order for immediate possession of the 
water in question Moyle put to a beneficial use the entire 
amount of water he was entitled to use under his owner-
ship of the 22%~: shares in question and also under his 
ownership of shares in the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch 
Company. Abs. 29-30. After the order of possession, 
July 23, 1926, he used no part of the water owned by him 
and represented by the 223A, shares not represented by 
stock in the Corporation but used only the water allotted 
to him on his shares of stock in the Big Cottonwood 
Tanner Ditch Corporation. Abs. 32-3; also Abs. 55-'6. In 
1926, and frequently since 1926 during the dry season 
Salt Lake City has diverted at the City's conduit the 
entire flow of Big Cottonwood stream and all the water 
entering the Tanner Ditch at those times is Jordan River 
water. At other times during the dry season the water 
entering the Tanner Ditch is a mixture of Big Cotton-
wood stream water and pumped Jordan River water and 
at all such times there is no water in the Tanner Ditch 
fit for culinary purposes; that has been the case con-
tinously since 19~6 to the time of the trial ( Abs. 30-31.) 
Prior to the pumping by the City, the water in the Tanner 
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Ditch was clear Big Cottonwood water fit for culinary 
purposes. ( Abs. 31.) 
Prior to 1926, when the water was taken by the 
City, :Jioyle used the Tanner Ditch as a tenant in common 
with the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Company as far 
down as he diYerted the ·water described as 22% shares 
from the Tanner Ditch. Because of that common use he 
paid to the Corporation each year an amount agreed 
upon as his share as such tenant in common of the upkeep 
of the Tanner Ditch. \Yhen the City took the water in 
1926 shortly thereafter :Moyle notified the Company he 
would not pay any such upkeep because he did not have 
the possession of the water as it was taken from him 
by the City. 
See Exhibit I, ~Ir. :\Ioyle's letter to Amos H. Turner, 
Secretary of Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Company, 
dated February 20, 1931, wherein he stated: 
"When you were in my office the other day 
and went over the items of expense constituting 
this $1.64 per share. I considered them reasonable, 
and as far as that is concerned, think they are a 
reasonable charge to be made for the 22%~: shares 
of stock and I would be glad to pay the total 
$38.41, which you requested if it were not for the 
fact that Salt Lake City has condemned this water 
right. Going over my files I find my letter of 
July 31, 192G directed to Big Cottonwood Tanner 
Ditch Co., Amos H. Turner, Sec., R.D. 3, Murray, 
Utah, a copy of which I inclose. The Big Cotton-
wood Tanner Ditch Co. ought to receive this 
money but as stated in the inclosed letter, Salt 
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Lake City was given possession of this water right 
in July 1926 and since that time, having the pos-
session of the water, should pay the assessment." 
Also, in a letter dated September 12, 1933, to Irvin 
T. Nelson, Treasurer of Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch 
Company, Mr. Moyle wrote as follows: 
''I can only inform you, as I have heretofore 
informed you each year as you send the statement, 
that Salt Lake City brought condemnation pro-
ceedings against this water several years ago, 
took possession of it, and has had the use and 
benefit of it ever since. I am not entitled to it, am 
not using it, and will not pay any upkeep ur any 
expense whatever, and I do not understand why 
you continue to send me these yearly statements, 
since, as stated, the water does not belong to me 
and has not been used by me. I do not know what 
Salt Lake City is doing with it, that is a matter 
between you and the City." (Exhibit J.) 
Also, to the same effect, see Exhibit K. 
Nevertheless the watermaster of the Company con-
tinued to issue to Moyle cards allotting to him the full 
amount of water represented by the 22%, shares involved 
herein. But the testimony of Moyle is positive that not 
withstanding such allotment cards he used only the water 
represented by the 23+ shares of corporate stock, and 
used no part of the water right represented by the 22%, 
shares not in the Corporation. Abs. 56. 
The reasonable value of the use of the water taken 
by the City from the time of its taking until the time of 
trial was at least $15.00 per share per annum; this was 
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the testimony of ~fr. :Moyle and was the lowest esti-
mate by any witness in the case; other witnesses fixed 
its value at $50.00 per share per annum; and in a con-
troversy between Salt Lake City and the Moyles before 
the State Engineer, the State Engineer found that the 
value of Big Cottonwood stream water in the vicinity 
of Moyle's place was ten times the value of Jordan River 
water delivered at the same place. Plaintiffs' position 
is that there is no evidence offered by defendant contra-
dicting the evidence on the question of damages. 
On pages 7, 8 and 9 of Appellants brief counsel has 
listed nine questions, lettered A to I inclusive, which he 
states are involved in this appeal. Six of these questions 
which are set out in full bel'ow, we submit are not involved 
in this appeal at all as there is no evidence on any such 
questions at all. These six questions are: 
Appellants question B: Can the plaintiffs recover 
a judgment for damages in any sum other than nominal 
damages without proving that damages have been suf-
fered 1 
Appellants question C: Can the plaintiffs waive a 
tort and sue on the implied contract and recover the rea-
sonable rental value of a water right where the water 
has never been reduced to possessi'On by the plaintiffs 1 
Appellants question D : 11ay you prove damages 
for the reasonable rental value of property by proving 
that the plaintiff believes that the property could have 
been sold for some stated amount and that the proceeds 
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from the sale could be loaned at a rate of interest that 
would appear satisfactory to the plaintiffs and then take 
the yield from that multiplication or computation as the 
reasonable rental value~ 
Ap,pellants question E: May the plaintiffs prove a 
reasonable rental value by having a witness testify that 
the water from the average run-off over a period of eight 
years would amount to a definite number of gallons and 
that multiplied by the price per gallon charged for cul-
inary use by Salt Lake City and the result divided by 
22% would give the reasonable rental value per share 
per year for the water rights claimed by Mr. Moyle¥ 
Appellants question G: May the plaintiffs, Moyles, 
use the culinary water through the pipes and all the irri-
gation water they used to maintain the growing of trees, 
shrubs and grass on their premises and still recover the 
full amount of the rental value of their water right¥ 
Appellants question H: May the plaintiffs recover 
the reasonable rental value of the water right for the 
years that the evidence conclusively shows there was no 
interference with plaintiffs water right by Salt Lake 
City~ 
And appellants other three questions may be asked 
in any case. They are : 
Appellants question A : Does the complaint state 
sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action against 
Salt Lake City~ 
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Appellants question F: ~[ay the Court take judi-
cial knowledge of the fact that tlw \Yater flowing from 
Big Cottonwood Canyon Creek untreated is fit for 
culinary use~ 
Appellants question I: l\lay a judgment stand which 
is not supported by the pleadings and the pleadings not 
supported by the evidence? l\lay the judgment stand 
where it atteinpts to order delivery of an incorporeal 
right.~ ~lay a judgment order- the return of possession 
of corporeal property when the evidence shows that the 
property is not now in existence, that is at least under 
anyone's control~ 
ARGUMENT 
The first contention argued by appellant is that 
plaintiffs complaint does not state a cause of action 
against defendant. He sets out in the brief (p. 10) that 
plaintiff alleges the taking of a water right and the 
taking of the water to which the right attaches; the with-
holding of the possession thereof from plaintiffs by 
defendant; the reasonable value of the use and possession 
of such water during the withholding was a stated 
amount and by reason of such withholding plaintiffs 
were damaged in the amount of such reasonable value 
of the use of the water; then defendant concluded his 
statement by saying there is no allegation in the com-
plaint of any damages sustained or suffered by plaintiffs. 
This position seems to arise from a confusion that runs 
throughout the brief. Counsel does not seem to consider 
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general damages as anything more than nominal dam-
ages. On his theory, a suit for conversion of a ton of 
sugar, alleging the conversion of the sugar, the value of 
the sugar at the time of the conversion and alleging the 
damage in the amount -of the value (say $100.00) would 
entitle the plaintiff to a judgment of only nominal 
damages. On his theory plaintiff would have to allege 
that he intended to make candy out of the sugar and 
make other allegations to show a right to recover special 
damages. This confusion runs throughout the whole 
brief. At page 15 he says ''plaintiffs' counsel in open 
court disclaimed any damages"; at page 24, "and their 
attorney in open court disclaimed any damage for any 
dimunition of water after 1926"; page 27, "they (the 
plaintiffs) through their attorney, in open court, dis-
claimed any right to recover damages, claiming they 
were not seeking damages and did not attempt to allege 
or prove any damages"; page 27, the statement is re-
peated. By reading what actually took place in open 
court it shows clearly that what counsel said was that 
we were not claiming special damages to trees, shrubs, 
lawns, vegetable garden and property-no where is it 
intimated that we were not seeking the damages alleged 
in the complaint. Plaintiffs spent nwst of their time at 
the trial in testimony tending to prove their damage and 
the amount thereof and defendant likewise called witness 
after witness to testify to things that the defendant has 
always (erroneously, we think) contended had a tendancy 
to reduce the amount of plaintiffs' damage. 
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There is no question but what a water appropriation 
right depends upon beneficial use; and it is equally true 
that if the appropriator fails to put the water to benefi-
cial use and allows the water to run waste another may 
use the ·water without doing any legal ·wrong to the appro-
priator. But it is equally true and equally well settled 
that an appropriator of \Yater may maintain an action 
for damages against one who obstructs, abstracts, or 
diverts the water to vYhich plaintiff is entitled or other 
wise interferes with his rights. 
''An appropriator is entitled to have the full quan-
tity of water called for by his appropriation flow in the 
natural stream, or in his ditch or canal, in such way that 
he can enjoy its use and for any material interference 
with his flow of water, by which his right to its use is 
substantially impaired, he may maintain an action for 
damages.'' 3 Kinney on Irrigation and Water Rights, 
p. 1662, p. 3054. Bailey v. Idaho Irr. Co., Limited (Idaho), 
227 Pac. 1055 at p. 1056, second column. J errett v. 
Mahan (Nev.), 17 Pac. 12. 
There can be no doubt that at common law, and under 
the code prescribing civil remedies, there would be a right 
of action for damages for a wrongful interference with a 
water right to the injury of the owner thereof. Van Bus-
kirk v. Red Buttes Land and Live Stock Co. (vVyo.), 156 
Pac. 1122 at 1126, bottom of second column. 
Defendant's brief cites Parks Canal v. Mining. Co., 
G7 Cal. 44, and quotes the whole opinion. That case 
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simply holds that the plaintiff therein could not bring 
an action for the value of the water as f.or personal 
property sold and delivered against one who, without his 
consent, has diverted the stream above the mouth of his 
ditch. No such question is involved in this case and no 
such complaint is on file herein. The decision is probably 
correct for one cannot ordinarily waive the tort in tres-
pass and recover in an action of contract because no 
promise can be implied. The taking of the water in the 
case at bar was not a tort but was taken under an express 
order of the court and whether the order for possession 
was erroneous or not, the taking could not have been a 
tort. .Assumpsit ·on a common count for goods sold and 
delivered is an action sounding in contract and as here-
tofore stated cannot be brought for the value of property 
taken by trespass, at least not taken in the manner the 
water was taken, if at all, in the case of Parks Oanal v. 
Hoyt, ante. That case counsel for the City probably 
obtained from 67 Cor. Jur. 1053, Para. 507, where it is 
specifically (and the only case cited) cited to the text that 
an action for the value of the water, as personal property 
sold and delivered, cannot be maintained against one who 
has diverted the stream above the head of the appropria-
tion ditch. The action of the plaintiffs in this case is 
fully supported in 67 Cor. Jur. 1052, para. 505 . 
.Appellant in its brief spends considerable time in 
explaining how its complaint in its S'o-called condem-
nation case of Salt Lake City v. Moyle does not state a 
cause of action. The Moyles interposed a general de-
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murrer to that complaint and that demurrer was sus-
tained by the Court and thereafter on motion of the City 
the rase was dismissed. So it is that on that ruling of the 
trial court at least the appellant and respondent agree. 
But because a complaint does not state a cause of action 
does not oust the Court to proceed in the case and pro-
nounce a Yalid judgment either correctly or erroneously. 
Courts have jurisdiction to err as well as to f·ollow the 
law. But appellant says that in the original complaint 
there was no allegation of certain conditions precedent 
to the bringing of conden1na tion proceeding to condemn 
a water right. Assuming, but not conceding, that the 
suit filed was a condemnati·on proceedings, it does not 
follow that because conditions precedent to the filing 
of the complaint were not alleged in the complaint that 
therefore the Court would have no jurisdiction to pro-
ceed; the defendant could "\Yaive such allegations and 
would do s·o by not raising the question and if raised 
the Court would have jurisdiction to rule rightly or to 
rule erroneously upon the question. Under a similar 
statute to the Utah statute cited in appellants brief, the 
Supreme Court of Wyoming, in the case of Edwards v. 
Cheyenne, 114 Pac. 677, at p. 694, holds that it is not 
necessary to allege the proper action by the City Council 
and adds that perhaps they should be shown at the hear-
ing. While the defendant in the condemnation proceed-
ing may ·waive any such action by the City authoritier; 
and may do so by failing to raise the que·stion the plain-
tiff is in no position to do it. It does not lie in his mouth 
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to say the the Court has no jurisdiction over the partic-
ular proceedings that he has instituted. 
''Jurisdiction of the person of the defendant 
is not essential to the commencement of a suit. 
But it is apparent that a suit is not commenced 
until the court has in some manner acquired juris-
diction of something in relation to the controversy. 
It must, therefore, be ·over the person of the plain-
tiff, or the subject matter, or both. The court ac-
quires jurisdiction of the plaintiff when he applies 
for its power and assistance to compel the de-
fendant to render him his rights under the law; 
but this aid must be sought according to pre-
scribed forms, and under our practice that form 
requires that he file with the clerk of the court a 
praecipe for the process he desires. This is an 
application, in its nature, to the court to send its 
process to require the defendant to appear at a 
subsequent term to defend the action. The Court 
clearly has jurisdiction of the plaintiff when he 
thus invokes its aid. When he thus submits his 
person to the court, he, by asking its aid, gives 
the court jurisdiction over the subject matter in 
controversy, and confers power to adjudicate and 
determine his rights- thus submitted. In this man-
ner the court becomes possessed of jurisdiction of 
the person of the plaintiff and of the subject 
n1atter, and when so possessed it becomes the duty 
of the court to commence and carry on the power 
to bring the defendant in to the court, that the 
case may be heard; and the rights of the parties 
in the matter thus brought before the court may 
be judicially and conclusively determined.'' 
Schroeder v. Merchants etc., Ins. Co., 104 Ill. 71 at 
75. Ex parte Cohen, 6 Cal. 318. 
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Jurisdiction of a particular action is acquired by the 
filing of pleadings which show the case to he within the 
general class of cases which the Court has jurisdiction 
to hear and determine and a petition or complaint which 
shows this is sufficient to gi,~e jurisdiction although it 
is defective in other respects. A plain illustration of 
this would be the exercise of the power of appointing a 
receiver by the Court ·where the complaint alleged no 
facts showing the necessity of such appointment; the 
appointment would not be void and it could not be 
attacked collaterally. 
It is true that Justice Frick speaks of the action of 
the City authorities as jurisdictional. In that case the 
defendant, not the City, was claiming that the complaint 
did not state a cause of action and he was so claiming 
it in the condemnation proceedings. ''The owner whose 
property is sought to be appropriated without his consent 
certainly has the right to insist that the statute be fol-
lowed. That is all Johnson is contending for on this 
appeal." ).[r. Justice Frick in Tremonton v. Johnson, 
49 Utah at p. 312. In this case at bar Salt Lake City is 
attempting to attack collaterally an order of the Court on 
account of a defect in their own complaint. 11r. Justice 
Frick certainly used jurisdiction to mean nothing more 
than it was necessary to state the action of the City au-
thorities in the c01nplaint in order to state a cause of 
action when the question was properly raised in the case 
by proper objection on the part of the property owner; 
that was all that was before the Court. 
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It is argued by counsel under Assignment of Error 
Nos. 2, 3 and 4 that the description of the water right in 
plaip.tiffs complaint is misleading. It is, in our opinion, 
strictly accurate. The right is a right to divert water 
through the Tanner ·Ditch from the Big Cottonwood 
stream; it -is not a right to divert water from the Tanner 
Ditch. Neither the Tanner Ditch nor the Big Cottonwood 
Tanner Ditch Company ever owned the right to divert 
the water from the Big Cottonwood stream. Nor is the 
position of counsel that there is no evidence of possession 
of the water by Salt Lake City tenable. The City under 
a showing of immediate possession procured from the 
Court an order for such immediate possession in July, 
1926. The evidence shows that April, May and June, 
1926, the water in Big Cottonwood stream was clear 
water; that in July, August, September and to October 
15, 1926, the water available at the intake of the Tanner 
Ditch was at least a mixture of Utah Lake water caused 
by Salt Lake City pumping such water into Big Cotton 
wood Stream. Abs. 139. That rendered the water of 
the Tanner Ditch non-potable and was an actual taking 
of the water of plaintiffs under the order of the Court. 
The evidence also shows that at least part of that time 
the entire flow of Big Cottonwood Creek was diverted at 
the City conduit by Salt Lake City. The evidence we 
think of the taking of possession of the water by Salt 
Lake City is quite conclusive. The order of the Court 
was for immediate possession because of the necessities 
of Salt Lake City and the City had all the means neces-
sary to take the water. It did take all the water of the 
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stream at times in 1926 and took it admittedly by pollut-
ing the water in July, August and September and 
October 1926. There is no evidence that the City ever 
returned the water to the plaintiffs. Although the City 
put on a witness, the as sis tan t City Engineer in charge 
of water supply, and especially in charge of the exchange 
contract on the Big Cottonwood stream, not a word came 
from him to show that the City did not immediately take 
possession of the water and had not kept the possession 
of the water until the time of the trial. 
''The right to own property carries with it 
the right to exercise dominion and control over it. 
'Vhen the dominion control and management of 
one's property is taken away from him, the right 
to private property is violated. To take away the 
dominion and control over property is to take the 
property itself, for the absolute right to property 
includes the right of dominion, control, and the 
management thereof." Fisher v. Bountiful City, 
21 u. 29. 
The Court in this case further said at page 35: 
"The domini·on and right to the use of the 
water and the control and diversion of the same 
for irrigation, culinary and other beneficial pur-
poses, was vested in the plaintiffs' by their appro-
priation and use, and they could not be deprived 
of such right except by their voluntary act, by for-
feiture, or by operation of law.'' 
Under Assignments Nos. 5 and 6, appellant contends 
that plaintiffs proved no damage. In our complaint we 
alleged the reasonable value of the use and possession 
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of the water during the time the water was taken from 
plaintiffs and alleged plaintiffs' damages in the amount 
of that reasonable value. The testimony of Mr. Moyle 
was that the reasonable rental value of that water at the 
time and in the vicinity of his property was $15.00 per 
share per annum for the whole time involved. This was 
the lowest value put on that water by any witness qual-
ified to testify as to its value. Mr. Moyle qualified to 
testify on the subject of value and there is a presumption 
that the owner of property knows its sale and rental 
value. The testimony of Mr. :Moyle on direct examina-
tion as abstracted (Abs. 37 and 38) is somewhat uncertain 
and in order to determine his true testimony in this re-
gard, it is necessary to refer to the Transcript, Pages 
80 to 83. 
M. R. Weiler, a resident of the immediate vicinity 
of the Moyle property and a man educated as an engineer, 
well acquainted with Big Cottonwood stream in its 
natural condition at that place, and one who had been 
in the market for culinary water in the vicinity of his 
home and of the Moyle premises, and with the amount of 
such water that would come to the Moyles place by reason 
of the 22%= shares owned by the M'Oyles outside the Cor-
poration, testified that fifty dollars per share per annum 
would be a conservative valuation for the use of that 
water. (Abs. 59-61, Trans. 123, 124.) 
On cross examination Mr. Moyle testified that in 
his judgment the shares were worth $800.00 per share. 
In a controversy between Salt Lake City and the plain-
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tiffs over this water in question before the State Engineer 
of Utah, that official found among his findings that Big 
Cottonwood stream water had a value at Moyles place 
and in that vicinity, of ten times as much as Utah Lake 
water pumped by Salt Lake City to the Tanner Ditch 
intake. That finding was a proper one to he found by 
the State Engineer in that controversy, was made in 
the course of his official duties and no one can doubt the 
qualifications of the State Engineer to determine that 
value. See Exh. E. It should carry great weight with 
any tribunal that was called upon to determine the value 
of water at that place. Had it been found by the Court 
in a controversy submitted to it the finding would have 
been res judicata. We do not claim it to be so because 
the finding was not made by a judicial tribunal; but we 
do claim that it is evidence of a very high order and 
entitled to great weight. On that valuation the rental 
value placed by Mr. Weiler would provide a very low 
rental return on the value determined by the State 
Engineer. It is true that the trial court said that he 
did not think that the finding of the State Engineer vvas 
competent evidence of value. On what theory it is not 
we do not know. The finding is in evidence for other 
purposes and we think has great weight on the question 
of value. 
On the defendant's part witnesses from far down 
on the Tanner Ditch were sworn and testified as to the 
value of water for irrigation purposes and that Utah 
Lake water was as valuable as Cottonwood water for 
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farm irrigation. We submit that each and every witness 
for defendant faHed to qualify as a witness as to the 
rental value of the 223)~, shares in question. They knew 
nothing about values except as to the value of Tanner 
Ditch corporate stock and its rental value. Even the 
witness Towler, the assistant City Engineer, testified:" I 
am perfectly frank to say that I based the rental value 
on the use to which Mr. Moyle had put the water there." 
That was, he testified, to irrigation use on the Moyle 
property. Trans. p. 301. Probably every eminent do-
main case tried contains an instruction to the general 
effect that the owner is entitled to the property's actual 
value for its highest or best use to which the property 
could be put at the time of the taking. And a witness's 
testimony on value where he excluded uses of a more 
valuable nature that the property could be put to at the 
time of the taking is of little or no value to aid court 
or jury to determine what is just compensation for the 
property. There is nothing in the record to justify the 
statement that Mr. Weiler, a witness for the plaintiffs, 
calculated his value of the l\Ioyle water by determining 
the number of gallons it would yield per annum and 
multiplying the amount by the price per gallon Salt 
Lake City charges for water delivered through its pipe 
line. Neither did any other witness in the case. So we 
say that the question as to whether that is a correct way 
of ascertaining the reasonable value of the use and pos-
session of the water in question is not in the case before 
the Court. But certain it is that a witness would not be 
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disqualified from testifying on the value simply because 
he knew at what price the City was charging for culinary 
water in that vicinity. Supposing that the City was 
selling its water through the pipe line at a price that 
would enable the plaintiffs to procure from the City 
through its pipe line an amount of water equal to that 
amount of culinary water that one share of the water 
in question would produce in a year at a charge of five 
dollars per annum; would the City be here arguing that 
that fact was immateriaH Hardly; this suit would have 
been settled long ago if that were a fact. 
The appellant complains because the trial court did 
not take into consideration any beneficial use that the 
plaintiffs received for the culinary water furnished 
through the pipe line or the Lake water furnished through 
the Tanner Ditch. The argument is not naive and we 
must recall some facts. In addition to the 22% shares of 
water in question, the Moyles' were the owners during all 
the time since July, 1926 (and for some time before) of 
more than 23 shares of the stock of the Big Cottonwood 
Tanner Ditch Company. This corporate stock furnished 
the ~[oyles with ample culinary water for their home and 
also ·with all the Tanner Ditch water that they used on 
their land. They cut down at once the amount of ground 
cultivated upon the entering of the order of the Court for 
immediate possession of their water right. Abs. 32-3 
and 56. :Mr. l\[oyle says that he was very careful not 
to use water other than that_ alloted to him on his cor-
porate stock. He knew that the order of the Court was 
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that the City was to have immediate possession of his 
water in Big Cottonwood stream and that the City was to 
make available to him Lake water in the Tanner Ditch 
and some culinary water in its pipe line; that is that the 
suit was to compel a trade in accordance with the contract 
with Tanner Ditch corporation. Mr. Moyle was not 
willing to agree to this and was opposed to entering into 
any such agreement. He knew, that if he accepted the 
terms of the proposed agreement he would be in no posi-
tion to resist the claims of the City that he should be 
compelled by the Court to accept those terms. And so 
it was that he was very careful not to use any of the 
water that the City claims was available for him. He 
was not compelled to accept those terms and was not 
compelled to minimize any damages he might suffer by 
reason of the taking of the City. There is no question 
of minimizing the damages in this case because we are 
not asking for special damages but only for general 
damages. 
Counsel says that Mr. Moyle was not entitled to any 
water rights during the non-irrigation season because 
he had ample culinary water through the City's pipe line. 
Just how that follows, the writer is not able to see. The 
water, the entire amount, was decreed to him during the 
entire year. Para. 7, p. 107 Abs. And Mr. Moyle testi-
fied that he so U'3ed it until deprived of the possession 
of it by the City under the order of the Court. Abs. 29. 
The City in its brief contends that the action is 
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barred by some statute of limitations; a sufficient answer 
to that is that the City frmn 1926 until the time of trial 
continued to take and possess the water belonging to 
plaintiffs under circumstances that renders the City liable 
for its reasonable rental value as damages for the loss 
of the use of the water by the plaintiffs. The right to 
bring an action for such damages existed at common law 
and does not rest upon any statute of the State. Out of 
abundance of caution, plaintiffs presented a claim to the 
City for a wrong then continuing to exist, not for one 
that had ceased to exist at some prior time, and then 
brought their action for that same wrong still continuing 
at the time of the filing of the action; and the testimony 
shows the wrong to still continue at the time of the trial. 
The right to bring the action at bar is not statutory but 
always has existed. The citation of Ilurley v. Bingham, 
63 Utah 589, cited by appellant, was an action for per-
sonal injuries and purely statutory. 
The argument that plaintiffs had abandoned any 
part of their \Vater right for any part of the year is not 
borne out by the evidence in the record, and the State 
Engineer, in the controversy instituted before that 
officer against the Moyles heretofore referred to, found 
that there had been no such abandonment. · 
Appellant's contention that the order of possession 
fixing what the City should do to reimburse Moyle for the 
taking of the possession of the water also fixed the re-
sponsibility of the City for such taking is simply unten-
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able. Courts do not make contracts for parties nor 
determine the damages in the absence of any action being 
brought to determine such damages. 
The contention that plaintiffs have been benefitted 
by the action of the City in beneficently bringing Utah 
Lake water to their place to exchange it for Big Cotton-
wood water is pure fiction; and even if it were true, the 
City has no right to force its benefactions upon its own 
residents to say nothing of the City trying to do it upon 
communities far beyond its boundaries. 
The plaintiffs were in possession of a water right in 
Big Cottonwood stream and defendant, being, as it assert-
ed, in sore need of that water right for the health and 
necessities of Salt Lake City inhabitants brought a spe-
cial proceedings to compel the plaintiffs to exchange that 
water right for certain amounts of Utah Lake water and 
a limited amount of culinary water from the City's pipe 
line. On such a complaint Salt Lake City procured an 
order of the Court for the immediate possession of that 
water right from the plaintiffs in this action. The City, 
so the evidence amply shows, took possession of all the 
water in the Big Cottonwood stream for long periods of 
time, leaving none of it to go down to the plaintiffs herein 
and put into said stream bed Utah Lake water, a very 
different and inferior quality of water. After many 
years the City had the special proceeding dismissed but 
has not yet returned the use of the water to these plain-
tiffs. This action was brought to recover the value of 
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the use of such water to taken and withheld by the City 
and for the return of that water to the plaintiffs for their 
use and benefit. In our opinion plaintiffs introduced 
competent and satisfactory evidence of the taking, the 
reasonable rental Yalue of that water during the with-
holding of it by the City from the plaintiffs and of every 
fact alleged in the complaint and of every fact in the trial 
court's findings. The evidence would have justified a 
much larger judgment but the plaintiffs felt that they 
were bound by the amount asked in their claim filed 
with the defendant, Salt Lake City. The City can at any 
time return that water but they seem to prefer to keep 
possession and risk the outcome of litigation. The evi-
dence and the law fully supports the judgment rendered 
by the trial court and we submit that the judgment 
should be affirmed in all particulars. 
Respectfully submitted, 
T. D. Lewis, 
David T. Lewis, 
0. W. Moyle Jr., 
Dan T. :Moyle, 
Attorneys for Respondents. 
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